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tempted to assert rights under the written agreement between the
plaintiff and Conelec and to prove these rights through parol evidence. e0 Thus, the defendants should not have been able to introduce this extrinsic evidence as "strangers." If the Court of Appeals
had taken this approach, it seems that the defendants would not
have been able to cast doubt upon the express terms of their own
agreement with the plaintiff.
Robert J. Sorge, Jr.

Harassment violation conviction cannot be the basis for the use of
collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action
The doctrine of collateral estoppel fosters judicial economy by
prohibiting the relitigation of previously adjudicated issues.'16 In
practice, the doctrine is not applied unless an adjudicated issue is
shown to be identical to and dispositive of the issue in the instant
case. 162 Moreover, it must be established that the parties to the
original action had a "full and fair opportunity to contest" the issue sought to be relitigated.' 53 In assessing whether such a "full
608, 326 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295 (3d Dep't 1971); County Trust Co. v. Mara, 242 App. Div. 206,
208, 273 N.Y.S. 597, 600 (1st Dep't 1934), af'd, 266 N.Y. 540, 195 N.E. 190 (1935).
16 53 N.Y.2d at 387, 425 N.E.2d at 808, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
"I Collateral estoppel is intended to prohibit the relitigation of previously adjudicated
issues, since such relitigation is considered "an unjustifiable duplication, an unwarranted
burden on the courts as well as on opposing parties." SIEGEL § 442, at 585; see Hoag v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 144-45, 225
N.E.2d 195, 197, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (1967); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,
275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937); Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 165, 166 (1969). The doctrine of collateral estoppel developed as a corollary to the doctrine of res judicata, Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d
481, 485, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1979); Weiner v. Greyhound Bus
Lines, Inc., 55 App. Div. 2d 189, 191, 389 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1976), which "requires
that when a cause of action has been adjudicated on the merits, the parties to the action are
bound by the judgment and may not relitigate the same cause of action between themselves." 5 WK&M 5011.24, at 50-116.2. The primary distinction between the two doctrines
is that res judicata applies to entire causes of action or defenses while collateral estoppel
applies to issues. SIEGEL § 457; see Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 165-69 (1969).
162 See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955, 960 (1969); Trombley v. Malloy, 66 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1020, 412 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (4th
Dep't 1978), af'd, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 405 N.E.2d 213, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1980); Hurlburt v.
Chenango County Dep't of Social Servs., 63 App. Div. 2d 805, 806, 405 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155
(3d Dep't 1978).
"163
Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955,
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and fair opportunity" was had, the courts look to several factors,
including the significance of the charges leveled in both the initial
and subsequent proceedings.6 Recently, in Gilberg v. Barbieri,e5
the Court of Appeals, stressing this factor, held that collateral estoppel does not bar an issue resolved in a harassment violation
proceeding from being relitigated in a subsequent civil action.168
The dispute in Gilberg arose when the defendant refused to
answer questions posed by the plaintiff, an attorney for the defendant's wife.16 7 At this juncture, the plaintiff ordered the defendant

to leave his office.16 Before leaving, however, the defendant scuffled with the plaintiff.169 Subsequently, the plaintiff caused the defendant to be charged with harassment,1 0 and after a brief nonjury
960 (1969); Trombley v. Malloy, 66 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1020, 412 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (4th Dep't
1978), afl'd, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 405 N.E.2d 213, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1980); Read v. Sacco, 49 App.
Div. 2d 471, 474, 375 N.Y.S.2d 371, 375 (2d Dep't 1975).
'" In Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1969), the court listed several factors which should be referred to in determining whether a
party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim. Id. at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 961. Included among these are "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior
litigation, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of
counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in
the applicable law and foreseeability of future litigation." Id. In applying these factors it is
necessary that the court examine the realities of the prior litigation. E.g., People v. Plevy, 52
N.Y.2d 58, 65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 522, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (1980). Indeed, the circumstances
surrounding each case must be scrutinized carefully to ensure that the party being estopped
is treated neither unfairly nor prejudicially. 800 Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 53 App. Div. 2d 463, 475-76, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604, 612 (2d Dep't 1976). For a discussion of
the Schwartz factors, see SIOEL § 467.
5 53 N.Y.2d 285, 423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981), rev'g 74 App. Div. 2d 913,
426 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1980).
'6653 N.Y.2d at 293-94, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. In its discussion of
collateral estoppel, the Gilberg Court used the terms "collateral estoppel" and "issue preclusion" interchangeably. To avoid confusion, however, and to facilitate both analysis and exposition, the Court of Appeals had previously stated that the term "issue preclusion" should
be used. In re American Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2., 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401
N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 n.2 (1977); see, e.g., Pace v. Perk, 81 App. Div. 2d 444, 460, 440 N.Y.S.2d
710, 720 (2d Dep't 1981); Brown v. Lockwood, 76 App. Div. 2d 721, 735, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186,
196 (2d Dep't 1980). The term "issue preclusion," it should be noted, was adopted by the
American Law Institute in section 68 of the Second Restatement of Judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).

11"53 N.Y.2d at 289, 423 N.E.2d at 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The defendant was present
in the plaintiff's office for an examination before trial, in connection with an alleged breach
of a separation agreement. Id. at 288-89, 423 N.E.2d at 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
Id. at 289, 423 N.E.2d at 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
'GOId.

170Id. The plaintiff commenced the action by filing an information in the City Court of
Mount Vernon charging the defendant with harassment. Id. Harassment is defined in the
Penal Law, which provides in part: "[a] person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to
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trial in the city court, the defendant was convicted. 171 The plaintiff

next instituted a civil action for damages 172 and shortly thereafter
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant's previous harassment conviction called for application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel regarding the issue of the defendant's liabilM The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion 17 4 and the Apity.17

pellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, holding that the
defendant's harassment
conviction established his liability as a
175
matter of law.

A closely divided Court of Appeals 1e reversed the appellate
division, holding that collateral estoppel does not prevent the rel-itigation in a civil action of an issue resolved in a harassment proceeding.17 7 In an opinion by Judge Wachtler, the majority observed

that, preliminary to the application of collateral estoppel, the
Court must conduct a "practical inquiry" into whether a party
harass, annoy or alarm another person; 1) He strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him
to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same. ... Harassment is a violation." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1980). A violation such as harassment is any
offense other than a traffic infraction for which a person cannot be imprisoned in excess of
15 days. Id. § 10(3) (McKinney 1975).
1
53 N.Y.2d at 289, 423 N.E.2d at 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 50. The plaintiff's stenographer, a witness at the harassment proceeding, testified that she was present at the time of
the altercation between the plaintiff and the defendant and that it was the defendant who
had struck the first blow. Id. After a brief trial, the court found the defendant guilty of
harassment and sentenced the defendant to a 1-year conditional discharge with the stipulation that he have no encounters with the plaintiff's law firm during that period. Id. at 28990, 423 N.E.2d at 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
12 Id. at 290, 423 N.E.2d at 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 50. The plaintiff instituted a civil
action for assault in which he sought $250,000 in damages for his injuries. Id.
173Id.
14 Id. After granting the motion for summary judgment, the court ordered the trial to
proceed solely on the issue of damages. Id.
171 74 App. Div. 2d 913, 913, 426 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (2d Dep't 1980), rev'd, 53 N.Y.2d 285,
423 N.E.2d 807, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1981). Justice Gibbons dissented from the decision on the
theory that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, which is paramount to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, had been abridged. 74 App. Div. 2d at 914, 426 N.Y.S.2d at
74 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
M7Judges Gabrielli, Jones, and Fuchsberg joined with Judge Wachtler. Judge Meyer
dissented and voted to affirm in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke and Judge
Jasen concurred.
1
53 N.Y.2d at 293-94, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. Notably, it is wellsettled that misdemeanor and felony convictions can be the basis for the use of collateral
estoppel in subsequent civil actions. See, e.g., S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32
N.Y.2d 300, 304-05, 298 N.E.2d 105, 107-08, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941-42 (1973); Read v. Sacco,
49 App. Div. 2d 471, 473, 375 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374 (2d Dep't 1975). See also In re Levy, 37
N.Y.2d 279, 281, 333 N.E.2d 350, 352, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1975) (per curiam); Vavolizza v.
Krieger, 33 N.Y.2d 351, 355-56, 308 N.E.2d 439, 442, 352 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (1974).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:171

against whom the doctrine is asserted had had a full and fair hearing. 1 8 Noting that harassment charges are similar to other "insignificant" 171 9 violations which are stripped of collateral estoppel
effect by statute, such as traffic infractions,1 80 the Court reasoned
that the defendants in such actions cannot be expected to defend
themselves vigorously. 81 Judge Wachtler concluded, therefore,
that the defendant in Gilberg had been denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his liability and that he properly could relitigate that issue in a civil action. 82
Authoring a vigorous dissent, Judge Meyer asserted that collateral estoppel properly may be premised upon a harassment conviction."" Judge Meyer stressed that the defendant's harassment
53 N.Y.2d at 292, 423 N.E.2d at 809, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
Id. at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. In addition to terming harassment
charges "insignificant," the Court noted that harassment proceedings, unlike civil actions,
may be tried without a jury. Id. Compare Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970)
(jury trial not required unless potential imprisonment is for a period greater than 6 months)
and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10(3) (McKinney 1975) (maximum sentence for a violation conviction is 15 days) with CPLR 4101 (1963) (jury trial required in civil actions for a sum of
money only).
180 53 N.Y.2d at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 809-10, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 51-52. A statutory provision
expressly denies collateral estoppel effect to traffic convictions. N.Y. VEH. & TRAp. LAW
§ 155 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Small claims actions have also been stripped of collateral estoppel effect. N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. AcT § 1808 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y.
CITY Civ. CT. AcT § 1808 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT § 1808 (McKinney
Supp. 1980-1981).
181 53 N.Y.2d at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court stated that
"[tihe brisk, often informal, way in which these matters must be tried, as well as the relative
insignificance of the outcome, afford the party neither opportunity nor incentive to litigate
thoroughly or as thoroughly as he might if more were at stake." Id.
182 Id. at 294, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52. In denying collateral estoppel
effect to harassment convictions, the Gilberg Court commented that a "contrary ruling...
would not reduce the amount of litigation in the long run." Id. The Court premised this
conclusion on two grounds. First, Judge Wachtler observed that, were harassment convictions to have collateral estoppel effect, potential civil plaintiffs would be wise "to file minor
criminal charges before commencing a civil action." Id. Second, the majority noted that
defendants, aware of this possibility, would defend minor charges "with a vigor out of all
proportion to ... [their] otherwise petty nature." Id. See Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel
in New York, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 165, 177 (1969). It is urged, however, that the majority's
reasoning is ill-founded. Because they may result in prison sentences, harassment charges
are not petty in nature. See note 192 and accompanying text infra.
183 53 N.Y.2d at 294-95, 423 N.E.2d at 810-11, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52-53 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer stated that although it was the plaintiff's burden to show identical
issues and that the issue was previously decided, it was the defendant's burden to prove that
he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his liability. Id. at 295, 423 N.E.2d at
811, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d
65, 73, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 962 (1969); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19
N.Y.2d 141, 148, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967)). Judge Meyer con.78
.79
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trial was a sufficiently formal and extensive hearing,"", that the defendant had been given a fair opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses,' and that the defendant had not met his burden of
proving otherwise. 186 The dissent further claimed that the defendant's nonjury harassment conviction properly could be used to
collaterally estop relitigation of his liability in a subsequent civil
action, irrespective of whether the defendant had a constitutional
right to a trial by jury in that subsequent action.' 87 Concluding,
Judge Meyer remarked that since the legislature had created
express exceptions to the collateral estoppel rule for certain minor
violations, the court "should not extend that list by implication."' 88
It is submitted that the Gilberg Court unjustifiably disparaged
the state system of prosecuting harassment charges by declaring
that convictions obtained thereunder are inadequate to support
the invocation of collateral estoppel. Surely, city court proceedings
are imbued with several elements which serve to ensure that harassment charges adequately are conducted. To obtain a harassment conviction, for instance, the prosecution must prove beyond a
tended that the plaintiff had met his burden but that the defendant had not. 53 N.Y.2d at
297, 423 N.E.2d at 812, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 54 (Meyer, J., dissenting). In reaching this conclusion, Judge Meyer stated that the Court need only examine those Schwartz factors raised in
the defendant's pleading since it was the defendant's burden to produce evidence showing a
new trial was necessary. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting); see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49
N.Y.2d 557, 560, 404 N.E.2d 718, 718, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1980).
' 53 N.Y.2d at 300, 423 N.E.2d at 813, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Judge Meyer observed that "the trial was conducted and completed with as much formality,
dignity and decorum as any Supreme Court trial." Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 298, 423 N.E.2d at 812-13, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 54-55 (Meyer, J., dissenting). In
addition to noting that the defendant had had an ample opportunity to argue his case, id.,
the dissent stressed that the collateral estoppel effect of the trial should not be annulled on
the theory that the plaintiff's civil action was unforeseeable. Id. at 301, 423 N.E.2d at 814,
441 N.Y.S.2d at 56 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Meyer contended that to state
that the subsequent civil action was unforeseeable would be to greatly underestimate the
competence of the trial judge and of the defendant's attorney. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 305, 423 N.E.2d at 816, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissent
maintained that the claim that the defendant had not had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his liability was totally inconsistent with the record of the case. Id. at 300, 423
N.E.2d at 813, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 303, 423 N.E.2d at 815, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979)). For a discussion of the right to
a jury trial as it relates to collateral estoppel, see Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hoisery, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 1002, 1018-29
(1979); Comment, Collision Course; Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment:
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 57 DEN. L. J. 115, 122-26 (1979).
1- 53 N.Y.2d at 305, 423 N.E.2d at 816, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed every element of
the offense charged. 189 Furthermore, although a defendant charged
with a harassment violation is not entitled to a jury trial, 190 the
conduct of the presiding judge is governed by a statutory provision
intended to forestall the improprieties which might ensue when a
judge sits as the trier of fact.1 91
Apart from the integrity of city court harassment proceedings,
it is notable that such proceedings can lead to prison sentences.192
Since most persons would contest vigorously any charge which
could result in a deprivation of their personal freedom,19 3 it is

urged that the Gilberg Court improperly termed harassment
charges "insignificant. 1

94

1

Indeed, the Court should not have per-

functorily equated harassment charges with traffic violations
19 5
which, in and of themselves, cannot result in prison sentences.
189CPL § 70.20 (1971). Since a violation is considered an offense by the Penal Law, see
note 170 supra, the standard of proof for a violation conviction is found in CPL § 70.20,
which provides that "[n]o conviction of an offense by verdict is valid unless based upon trial
evidence which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt every element of such offense and the
defendant's commission thereof." CPL § 70.20 (1971). Moreover, evidence is not legally sufficient unless it is competent and, if necessary, corroborated. CPL § 70.10(1) (1971). The
reason for these strict requirements is the overriding importance in a criminal proceeding to
reach a correct decision, whereas the primary concern in a civil dispute is to resolve the
matter in a peaceful, orderly, and impartial manner. See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64,
417 N.E.2d 518, 521-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227-28 (1980); People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d
333, 345, 406 N.E.2d 783, 789-90, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 933-34 (1980). See also SmGEL § 453.
190 CPL § 340.40 (1971). If all the required elements for the application of collateral
estoppel are present, it is clear that the absence of a jury trial should not prevent the doctrine's use. Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REV. 442, 456 (1971). The Second Restatement of Judgments has
adopted a similar view: "[tihe determination of an issue by a judge in a proceeding conducted without a jury is conclusive in a subsequent action whether or not there would have
been a right to a jury in that subsequent action if collateral estoppel did not apply." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d, at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); see
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979).
191 See CPL § 350.10 (1971). CPL section 350.10 was enacted to regulate the conduct of
judges presiding over nonjury trials in local criminal courts. CPL § 350.10, commentary at
68 (1971). The statute contains guidelines regarding, inter alia, the delivery of opening addresses by attorneys, CPL § 350.10 (3)(a) (1971), the order in which evidence must be offered, id. at (3)(b), the delivery of summations, id. at (3)(c), and motion practice, id. at (4).
192 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10(3) (McKinney 1975); id. § 240.25 (McKinney 1980); note
170 supra.
193 The Gilberg Court appears to have deemphasized the importance people place on
their freedom. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970). In Baldwin, the court
noted that "the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom will be
viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious
repercussions affecting his career and his reputation." Id.
19,53 N.Y.2d at 293, 423 N.E.2d at 810, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
195Id. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 227(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The Vehicle
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Moreover, other factors serve to distinguish harassment violations
from traffic violations.19 6 In a traffic violation hearing the state
must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence and not, as in
a harassment proceeding, by the heavier burden of reasonable
doubt. 9 7 There is also a greater emphasis upon speedy disposition
of traffic violations.198 Indeed, it is suggested that the mere convenience of indicating a guilty plea in the space so provided on a
"mailer" form 19 9 encourages quick resolution of such matters. It is
evident that most drivers prefer this alternative to a day in Traffic
Court. °00
and Traffic Law provides that:
The commissioner or his designee may ...

[impose] .

.

. any penalty authorized

by any provision of this chapter for a conviction of ... [a traffic infraction], except that no penalty therefore shall include imprisonment.
Id. Further evidence of the insignificance of traffic infractions is that they are not governed
by the CPL. See Sulli v. Appeals Bd. of Administrative Adjudication Bureau, 55 App. Div.
2d 457, 460, 390 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (4th Dep't 1977); [1981] 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 121.2.
190 Perhaps the most obvious distinction between a harassment violation and a traffic
conviction is statutory. Indeed, a violation, including harassment, is defined as an offense
other than a traffic infraction for which a person cannot be imprisoned in excess of 15 days.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10(3) (McKinney 1975). In addition to harassment, the Penal Law labels
several other offenses as violations. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100.00 (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981) (criminal solicitation in the fifth degree); id. § 140.05 (McKinney 1975) (trespass); id. § 240.20 (McKinney 1980) (disorderly conduct).
197 See Rosenthal v. Hartnett, 36 N.Y.2d 269, 271, 326 N.E.2d 811, 812, 367 N.Y.S.2d
247, 248 (1975). Compare N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 227(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981)
(clear and convincing evidence is necessary to sustain traffic infraction conviction) with CPL
§ 70.20 (1971) (conviction for an offense requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of the offense). In Rosenthal, the court held that an adjudication of a traffic infraction by an administrative agency may be based upon clear and convincing evidence since the
maximum penalty which may be imposed is a fine. 36 N.Y.2d 269, 271, 326 N.E.2d 811, 812,
367 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248 (1975).
198 The intent of the legislature in creating an administrative agency to handle traffic
infractions was to reduce overcrowding in criminal courts and to provide a means to dispose
of moving violation charges speedily. Ch. 1074, § 1, [1969] N.Y. Laws 2873.
199N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 226(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
Answer by mail-admitting charge. If a person charged with the violation admits to the violation as charged in the summons, he may complete an appropriate
form prescribed by the commissioner and forward such form and summons ... to
the office of the department specified on such summons. If a schedule of penalties
for violations has been established, and such schedule appears on the answer form,
a check or money order in the amount of the penalty for the violation charged if
included in such schedule, must also be submitted with such answer.
Id.
200 In 1979, the New York Traffic Violations Bureau processed 1,145,538 traffic violation complaints. [1979] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 13. Of these, approximately 575,934 "resulted in pleas of guilty, which were submitted by mail and did not result
in hearings." Id. The following table, compiled from several annual reports of the New York
Department of Motor Vehicles, is illustrative:
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In summary, it is clear that when the legislature has determined that a judgment should be denied collateral estoppel effect,
it has codified that intent.201 Therefore, in the absence of such an
express legislative intent, it is submitted that the courts should not
preclude application of collateral estoppel absent circumstances
which strongly suggest otherwise.
Jack Wilk

Collateral estoppel effect of a default judgment upon a medical
malpractice action
The preceding case demonstrated that harassment violation
proceedings may properly be imbued with collateral estoppel effect. 202 Among other things, the threat of a prison sentence, the
decorum of city court proceedings, and the active defense conducted by the defendant in Gilberg evinced the defendant's awareness of the significance of the proceedings. 20 3 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals, equating such harassment conviction to a traffic
infraction conviction, held that it should not be accorded collateral
estoppel effect. 204 Consider, however, a default judgment 205 or a

YEAR

PCT.
HEARINGS
PCT.
HEARINGS
PCT.
COMPLAINTS
HEARINGS HEARINGS BYPASSED BYPASSED APPEALED APPEALED
FILED
1,079,266
1,145,538
1,102,174
965,423
951,394

1980
1979
1978
1977
1976

521,691
569,604
545,758
466,058
460,982

48.3%
49.5%
49.5%
48.3%
48.5%

557,575
575,934
556,416
499,365
490,412

51.7%
50.3%
50.5%
51.7%
51.5%

1,170
1,350
1,135
922
680

.22%
.24%
.21%
.20%
.15%

[1980] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 7; [1979] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 13; [1978] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 9; [1977] N.Y.S.
DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP. 23; [1976] N.Y.S. DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES ANN. REP.

12. Notably, the opportunity for a hearing is bypassed in over 50% of the traffic infraction
cases. Of even greater interest is that when hearings are conducted less than one percent of
the decisions rendered are appealed.
201

See note 180 supra.

202

See notes 189-191 and accompanying text supra.

203 See id.

204 See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
20I See CPLR 3215 (1970). "When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to

trial of an action reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any
other neglect to proceed, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him." Id. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "a judgment by default is just as conclusive an
adjudication. . . [on] essential [facts] to support the judgment as one rendered after answer
and contest." Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683, 691 (1895); accord,

